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May 6, 1994

William F. Caton, Acting Secretary Federal Communications Commission 1919 M Street, N.W., Room 222 Washington, D.C., 20554

Re: EX PARTE PRESENTATION in CC Docket No. 92-77

Dear Mr. Caton:

On behalf of Capital Network System, Inc., today Brian Ashby of this office and I met with James R. Coltharp, Special Advisor to Commissioner Barrett to discuss the issues in the above-referenced docket. In addition to the positions expressed in CNS's formal comments filed in the proceeding, the points in the attached outline were discussed.

In accordance with the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(a) - (b), I am filing an original and two copies of this notice of ex parte presentation. Please direct any questions about this filing to me.

Sincerely,

Randolph J. May

Randolph & May

**Enclosure** 

cc: James R. Colthrap

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
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CAPITAL NETWORK SYSTEM, INC.

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## **BILLED PARTY PREFERENCE**



- CAPITAL NETWORK SYSTEM, INC. BEGAN AS A START-UP COMPANY IN 1988 AS A REGIONAL CARRIER AND NOW EMPLOYS OVER 250 PEOPLE, PRIMARILY IN THE PROVISION OF OPERATOR SERVICES
- BILLED PARTY PREFERENCE IS UNNECESSARY TO RESOLVE ANY PERCEIVED PROBLEM IN THE OPERATOR SERVICES MARKETPLACE
  - As a result of TOCSIA, unblocking of payphones is complete and carrier branding and signage is required so end users easily can reach their interexchange carrier of choice.
  - As far back as in its December 1992 Report to Congress, the FCC determined that access code calling had achieved substantial marketplace acceptance.
  - Today, even more than in December 1992, interexchange carriers actively and

successfully market "dial around" products such as 10XXX and 800 numbers, such as MCI's 1-800-COLLECT and AT&T's 1-800-OPERATOR, and debit cards.

- Over 60% of transient end users reach their desired interexchange carrier without any additional processing.
- After government policy has promoted successfully the use of dial around through implementation of TOCSIA, it would be very confusing to consumers for government policy to now mandate a change in dialing patterns.
- THE COSTS TO IMPLEMENT BPP ARE ENORMOUS AND CLEARLY OUTWEIGH ANY LIMITED BENEFITS
  - The record indicates that initial implementation costs would exceed \$1.5 billion, with annual ongoing operating costs in excess of \$500 million. (These estimates are stale, and the actual costs estimates today would likely be higher.)

- A Frost and Sullivan study submitted by COMPTEL estimates that BPP preference will cost 63¢ per telephone call affected, and this cost must ultimately be recovered from consumers.
- Payphone and premises owners will find other ways to recover lost commission revenues and this compensation will be passed on to consumers in any event.

## ■ IMPLEMENTATION OF BPP WOULD BE ANTICOMPETITIVE

- BPP would expand the local exchange carrier monopoly and impede the development of alternative access providers.
- BPP would create a tight oligopoly in the operator services marketplace for only the very largest national interexchange carriers by eliminating smaller regional carriers as competitors.
- Although proponents couch BPP arguments as pro-consumer choice, the proponents argue against balloting of consumers and in favor of automatic assignment of operator

service calls to the user's 1+ carrier. The proponents' approach assumes that 1+ and 0+ services are the same, but instead they constitute two separate markets in which competition should be promoted in each.

- OSP RATES WOULD BE REDUCED IF THE COMMISSION WOULD TAKE ACTIONS TO REDUCE OSP COSTS
  - FCC's failure to grant the CNS/COMPTEL Petition to require LECs to make available billing and collection services on a nondiscriminatory basis increases OSPs' costs vis-a-vis AT&T's. For example, lack of nondiscriminatory billing and collection services means OSPs have much higher per record collection costs and uncollectible revenues.
  - FCC's failure to mandate nondiscriminatory validation access for AT&T's CIID card increases OSPs' costs vis-a-vis AT&T's.